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BANKRUPTCY: SECTION 70 (c) OF BANKRUPTCY ACT
APPLIED TO EMPOWER TRUSTEE TO SET ASIDE
UNFILED FEDERAL TAX LIEN
UNDER SECTION 6323 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, a federal
tax lien is not valid against a "judgment creditor" unless notice of
the lien has been filed.' The courts have consistently rejected the
contention that section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act2 confers upon a
trustee in bankruptcy the rights of a "judgment creditor" within
the meaning of section 6323 (a).3 In the case of In re Kurtz Roofing
Co., 4 however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held to the
contrary, thereby enabling the trustee to invalidate an unfiled ante-
cedent federal tax lien.
Although the federal tax lien asserted in Kurtz was established
both by assessment and demand, 5 it was not filed prior to the date
of bankruptcy. Because section 70c confers upon the trustee all
the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by
1 "The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the
Secretary or his delegate .... " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (a). Notice is filed
in the office designated by the law of the state in which the property subject to
the lien is located or, in the absence of this designation, with the clerk of the United
States district court. Ibid. § 6323 (a) (1)- (2). The form of the notice may not be
unduly complicated by state law. Ibid. § 6323 (b).
2 "The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or control
of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien
thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists." 66 Stat.
430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110c (1958). (Emphasis added.)
sSimonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
369 U.S. 38 (1962); In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956); United
States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955); In the Matter of Babcock Printing
Press Co., 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 88321 (N.D. Ohio 1962); In the Matter of Gale Dorothea
Mechanisms, Inc., 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 73421 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); In the Matter of Green,
124 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ala. 1954); In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co., 110 F. Supp. Ill
(E.D. Mich. 1951). Contra, In the Matter of Sport Coal Co., 125 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.W.
Va. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th
Cir. 1955).
'335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964).
5 Id. at 312. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321-22.
legal or equitable proceedings as of the date of bankruptcy,6 the
court reasoned that he possesses the rights of a judgment creditor
holding a lien.7 Finding no convincing reasons of policy or pre-
cedent to preclude an equation of these rights to those of the "judg-
ment creditor" of section 6323 (a), the court held the trustee entitled
to that section's protection against the unfiled tax lien.,
One of the primary objectives of the Bankruptcy Act is the equi-
table distribution of an insolvent debtor's estate. 9 In order to achieve
this objective the trustee should have the power to obtain assets
which creditors might reach by proceeding against third parties with
unrecorded liens or similarly voidable interests.1 0 After the act was
passed in 1898, the courts construed section 70a (5)" so that it gave
the trustee this power.12 In 1906, however, the Supreme Court
limited the effectiveness of this interpretation by withdrawing from
the trustee the power to attack an encumbrance which, although
voidable under state law, could not have been set aside because no
creditor existed at the time of bankruptcy who could have availed
himself of this right.13 The predecessor to section 70c was, therefore,
added in 191014 to negate the effect of that decision. Under this
amendment, the trustee was accorded the status (1) of a creditor
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings as to property com-
ing into the custody of the bankruptcy court and (2) the somewhat
weaker position of a judgment creditor holding an unsatisfied execu-
tion15 as to all other property. In 1950 Congress deleted the second
provision and gave the trustee the status of a creditor holding a lien
by legal or equitable proceeding as to both types of property,
0 "Date of bankruptcy" refers to the date when the petition was filed. Bankruptcy
Act § 1 (13), 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (13) (1952):
"A judgment creditor without a lien is not protected by § 6323 (a). Miller v. Bank
of America, 166 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1948) (decided under predecessor to § 6323 (a)).
8335 F.2d at 314.
' 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 64.02, at 2058 (14th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIER].
10See MacLachlan, The Title and Rights of the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 14
RurTGEs L. REv. 653, 667 (1960).
' 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a) (5) (1958).
12 4 COLLIER $ 70.47, at 1388, 70A8.
" York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906). See 4 COLLIER 70.47; MAc-
LACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 183, at 187 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MAcLAcHLAN]; 3
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 1600 (1957).,
2 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 838. "
18 A judgment creditor does not necessarily have a lien. See 4 COLLIm 67.08;
MAcLACHLAN § 183, at 187. See also note 7 supra.
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whether or not such a creditor actually exists.16 Although this change
was intended to simplify and expand the rights of the trustee,17 prior
to Kurtz it was held that the deletion of the words "judgment credi-
tor" in section 70c prevented the trustee from acquiring the protec-
tion of section 6323 (a).18
A more compelling basis for these decisions was found in
United States v. Gilbert Associates."0 In that case the Supreme Court
held that a municipality holding a lien could not be accorded the
protection of section 6323 (a) as a "judgment creditor." The Court
reasoned that since uniformity of application among the states is a
cardinal principle of the congressional tax scheme, the "judgment
creditor" of section 6323 (a) should be restrictively defined as one
"in the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record,
since all states have such courts. '20 Subsequent lower court de-
cisions have held that the trustee in bankruptcy cannot satisfy the
Gilbert formula because he does not actually derive his status from
a judgment of a court of record.21
In Kurtz, therefore, the court found it necessary either to dis-
tinguish or reconcile its decision with the Gilbert definition of a
section 6323 (a) judgment creditor. In this respect Kurtz reflects
the virtually unanimous criticism by legal commentators of the ap-
plication of Gilbert by previous cases.22 The court reasoned that
since Gilbert dealt only with the relative priority of lienholders out-
side bankruptcy, its restrictive definition should not be literally ap-
plied in determining the congressionally conferred powers of a trus-
tee in bankruptcy.28  The problem of uniformity which prompted
the Gilbert definition, moreover, is not present with respect to
26Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, § 2, 64 Stat. 26.
27 H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949); see 4 COLLIER 70-47.
18 In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776, 781-82 (Sd Cir.), cert. denied,
364 US. 828 (1960).
1 345 U.S. 361 (1958).
201d. at 364.
Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
369 U.S. 38 (1962); In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776, 781 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); Brust v. Stufn, 237 F.2d 135, 136 (2d Cir. 1956);
United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1955). This reasoning suggests
it would be necessary to amend either § 6323 (a) or § 70c in order for the trustee to
prevail. See In the Matter of Green, 124 F. Supp. 481, 482 (N.D. Ala. 1954).
32 E.g., 4 Cou.nR 1 70.49 n.3c; MAcLAcHLAN § 183, at 192; Loiseaux, Federal Tax
Liens in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 137, 138-42 (1961); Seligson, Creditors Rights,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 708-11 (1961).
23 335 F.2d at 314; accord, In the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776, 785
(3d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960).
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applying section 6323 (a) in bankruptcy because the trustee's posi-
tion is congressionally established and not subject to variation from
state to state.2 4 Furthermore, the Kurtz court indicated that even
if the Gilbert definition were applicable, the trustee in bankruptcy
should nevertheless fall within its scope. Conceding that the trustee
is obviously not in fact a judgment creditor, the court relied upon
the legislative development2 5 and judicial interpretation 26 of section
70c in determining that he is deemed under that provision to possess
all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor. To say
that the trustee should be denied the protection of section 6323 (a)
merely because his rights as a judgment creditor are conferred by
congressional rather than judicial authority, the court concluded, is
to rely upon a wholly superficial distinction and one which the
Supreme Court could not have intended to establish in Gilbert.27
Although both sections 70c and 6323 (a) were specifically di-
rected against the harsh effects of secret liens,28 Kurtz represents a
choice between two broader considerations of policy. On the one
hand is the attempt by Congress through the Bankruptcy Act to
confer on the trustee powers extensive enough for the equitable
and efficient distribution of the debtor's estate 29 To effectuate this
objective Congress has continually extended the trustee's power to
invalidate pre-bankruptcy encumbrances.30 In cases where these
2
, See Loiseaux, supra note 22, at 140.
,21395 F.2d at 312-18. "[T]he [1950] amendment to section 7Oc ... has been placed
in the bill . . . to simplify and to some extent expand, the general expression of the
rights of trustees in bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
(Emphasis added.) See 4 CoLUaR 70.47. The court reasoned that the legislative
intention to expand the trustee's power under § 70c included the lesser rights of
a judgment creditor. 335 F.2d at 312-13. See 4 COLUER 70.49 n.3c; MAcLAHILAN §
1602 (1957); Loiseaux, supra note 22, at 139; Seligson, supra note 22, at 709; note 14
supra.
" The trustee has frequently been described as a judgment creditor under § 70c
as against pre-bankruptcy encumbrances other than tax liens. See, e.g., In re Ripp.
242 F.2d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1957); B. F. Avery & Sons v. Davis, 226 F.2d 942, 945 (5th
Cir. 1955); Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
927 (1952). a .
7 335 F.2d at 314.
28 See United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1953); Sampsell v.
Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
"See 3 CoLuma 60.01.
"
0Bankruptcy Act § 60, 64 Stat. 24 (1950), as'amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (Supp. V.
1964) (preferential transfers); § 67a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
107a (1958) (judidal liens); § 67c, 66 Stat. 427 (1952); 11 U.S.C. § 107c (1958>
(statutory liens); § 67d, 66 Stat. 428 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1958) (fraudulent
transfers); § 70e, 52 Stat. 882 (1938), as amefided,'1 U.S.C. § 110e (1958) (transfers
voidable under any nonbankruptcy law). Under none of these provisions, however.
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specific extensions are inadequate, the lienholder status given the
trustee under section 70c enables him to challenge the particular
encumbrance. 31
Confronting these extensive provisions for efficient bankruptcy
administration is the federal tax lien created to insure the prompt
and certain collection of overdue taxes.3 2  This lien arises auto-
matically at the time of assessment 33 and is perfected by demand,
after which it relates back to the assessment date.34 With the excep-
tion of those secured creditors protected by section 6323 (a), 85 the
federal lien, whether or not it is, filed, prevails over any subsequent
interest. 6 Furthermore, the inchoate lien doctrine, originally de-
veloped in insolvency liquidations outside federal bankruptcy, has
been judicially incorporated into the federal tax lien provisions,
rendering the lien practically invulnerable to any other antecedent
interest.' 7  Outside bankruptcy, therefore, both congressional and
* judicial treatment has placed the federal tax lien in an overwhelm-
ingly advantageous position.
I The joint construction of federal statutes should not result in
the subversion of basic policies unless unavoidable. The re-
sult obtained by the Kurtz decision does not amount to a
significant frustration of the purposes of the federal tax lien pro-
visions. All that Kurtz requires is that the government follow the
can the trustee normally challenge the federal tax lien effectively. See Comment,
Avoiding Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 TFxAs L. REV. 616 (1961); 35 IND. L.J.
351, 353-57 (1960).
32 4 COLLiER 70.45, at 1383; MACLACHLAN § 183, at 186-87.
The primary purpose of these provisions is to insure prompt and certain collec-
.ion from delinquent taxpayers. E.g., United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,
340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950); United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 US. 895 (1960).
:SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322.
S 6 in the Matter of Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776, 780 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960). Unless the lien is filed for record there is no practicable
wky of. discovering it. See Walker, What Protection Against the Secret Federal Tax
Lien, 9 J. TAXATION 8 (1958). -
85 Mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, judgment creditors. INT. RrV. CODE oF 1954,
§ 6323 (a). The history of the federal tax lien shows that exemptions from the lien
* are strictly construed. See United States v. Security Trust & Say. 'Bank, 840 U.S. 47,
53 (1950) (concurring opinion).
"See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
'¢ Under- the inchoate lien doctrine the government lien prevails over any ante-
cedent lien which is not "perfected." The standard of "perfection" requires certainty
as to the identity of the lienor, the amount of the lien, and the property to which
it attaches. ' Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946). For a
complete discussion of the development of the inchoatt lien doctrine and of the
incorporation of the doctrine into the federal tax lien provisions, see Kennedy, The
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simple procedure for filing notice of its lien3 8 prior to the date of
bankruptcy. Moreover, Congress has not displayed an aversion un-
der the Bankruptcy Act to modifying the government's tax collecting
power when necessary to avoid inequitable distribution of the bank-
rupt's estate. For example, under section 67c (1), the satisfaction of
the federal tax lien will, in certain situations, be postponed until the
payment of administrative expenses and wage claims.3 9 Thus Kurtz
can to some extent be justified as merely a constructional recognition
of the congressional modification of the government's taxing power
within the context of bankruptcy.
On the .other hand, a contrary result in Kurtz may well have dis-
rupted efficient bankruptcy administration. Section 70c was intended
to enable the trustee to preserve for unsecured creditors assets en-
cumbered by secret liens. If, however, the trustee is prohibited from
avoiding an unfiled and therefore secret tax lien, an element of un-
certainty would linger over every bankruptcy administration. In
three-quarters of the straight bankruptcy cases there is nothing left
for administrative expenses after the satisfaction of the secured credi-
tors and allowance for exemptions. 40 Tax liens are a significant cause
of this situation.4' The primary beneficiaries of the Kurtz decision
are those creditors whose claims fall within the first two priorities of
section 64 (a), including those created by the preservation .and ad-
ministration of the estate. 42 Bankruptcy administration would be
facilitated if those who extend credit to the bankrupt estate during
administration are accorded the certainty of knowing whether there
Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate
and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954).
'8 See note 1 supra; Walker, supra note 34, at 9.
31 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107c(1) (1958). Under this provision, federal
tax liens on personal property are subordinated to the first two priorities (admin-
istrative expenses and wage claims) unless: (1) enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy;
(2) the Government takes possession of the property; or (3) the estate of the taxpayer
is solvent at the date of bankruptcy.
40 Countryman, Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARv. L. Rv. 1452, 1453 (1964).
1IMvCLACHLAN § 18, at 15.
12 Section 64a, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (Supp. V, 1964).
The first four priorities are: (1) expenses of the administration and preservation of
the estate; (2) wage claims; (3) expenses of successful opposition to an arrangement
or discharge and of adducing evidence resulting in conviction of a bankruptcy offense;
(4) federal, state, and local tax claims. See MACLAcHLAN § 151-54. The general
unsecured creditors will derive no benefit from the Kurtz decision since the govern-
ment's invalidated lien will remain as a fourth priority claim. Whether the trustee
might in certain circumstances be permitted to assert the invalidated lien for the
benefit of the estate, and thus affect the claims of other secured creditors, is not clear.
See 4 COLLIER 70A8 n.30.
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are sufficient assets to pay their claims. 48 Moreover, effective bank-
ruptcy liquidation is as much a matter of business judgment as of
law.44 If apparently unencumbered assets are actually subject to a
secret federal tax lien, unnecessary expenses in planning for the ad-
ministration of the estate may be incurred. Prime examples would
be the uncertainty attenuating decisions such as whether to appoint
a receiver or maintain a debtor's business operations.
The Kurtz decision is sound not only in the technical reasons
by which it justifies the correlation of sections 6323 (a) and 70c, but
also in the policy choice which it reflects. Certainly the minimal
burden imposed upon the government in its tax-collecting proce-
dure is wholly outweighed by the utility of eliminating a potentially
disruptive variable from bankruptcy proceedings.
,"'See 35 IND. L.J. 351, 359-60 (1960).
"MAcLAcHLAN § 76, at 69.
